Abstract:
Since the closure of the “Tokyo War Crimes Trial” in December 1948 via the judicial proceedings undertaken by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), there has been continued debate about whether justice was done, whether merely “victors’ justice” obtained in the majority judgment, whether both law and morality were reasonably engaged in a judgment that referenced both positive international law and natural law, whether it was legally and morally proper for the Tribunal to have excluded an examination of alleged war crimes on the part of the Allied Powers (i.e., for indiscriminate incendiary and atomic bombing of Japanese cities), etc. Most interesting in this trial was the entirely dissentient judgment rendered by Justice Radhabinod Pal (representative of India). Pal’s judgment challenged the application of ex post facto positive law while positioning himself from the outset in a fundamental contestation of the legitimacy of the Tribunal. In this essay, these various issues are engaged with attention to Pal’s judgment specifically and his concern for due process, thereby for a juridical disposition that would ensure justice due the defendants and the Japanese nation.